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We ask how export demand shocks associated with the Asian financial crisis affected Chinese exporters.
We construct firm-specific exchange rate shocks based on the pre-crisis destinations of firms’ exports.
Because the shocks were unanticipated and large, they are a plausible instrument for identifying the
impact of exporting on firm productivity and other outcomes. We find that firms whose export destinations
experience greater currency depreciation have slower export growth, and that export growth leads
to increases firm productivity and other firm performance measures. Consistent with “learning-by-exporting”,
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Participation in export markets is often viewed as a prerequisite for economic growth in 
developing countries. For example, in a report on the East Asian miracle, the World Bank (1993) 
pointed to export-oriented economic policies as playing a critical role in the region’s rapid 
economic development. Cross-country studies document a positive relationship between trade 
and growth performance (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Edwards, 1998;  Frankel and Romer, 1999), 
but substantial controversy persists over whether there exists a causal impact of exporting on 
economic growth. Growth could cause exports, or both growth and exports could be caused by 
other factors.
1 
Recently, a number of papers have empirically examined the relationship between 
exporting and economic performance using firm-level panel data.  A robust finding has been that 
more productive firms enter export markets.  For example, Bernard and Jensen (1999) document 
among US firms that, in addition to having higher productivity, exporting firms also have higher 
employment, shipments, wages, and capital intensity than non-exporters; and Clerides, Lach, and 
Tybout (1998) find that exporting firms have higher productivity levels on average than non-
exporters in several developing countries.  However, findings on whether exporting itself 
increases firm productivity have been much more mixed.
2  Two papers using firm data from 
China by Kraay (1999) and Zhang (2005) find positive evidence for learning-by-exporting. 
One weakness of all of these studies is that they cannot distinguish clearly between the 
effects of exporting and the unobservable differences between exporting and non-exporting 
firms.  Typically, change in firm productivity or other performance measures is regressed on 
initial exporter status and other initial period controls using OLS, or the level of firm 
performance is regressed on current or lagged export status in addition to other controls.  In the 
latter case, further lags are sometimes used as instruments, relying on assumptions about the 
underlying dynamic model (Kraay, 1999; Van Biesebroeck, 2004).   
Since the decisions to export and how much to export are endogenous choices of the firm, 
                                                 
1See Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) and Irwin and Terviö (2002), for example. 
2Papers that find little or no evidence of learning-by-exporting include Aw et al (2000), Bernard and Jensen (1999), 
Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998), and Delgado et al. (2002). Papers that find positive evidence of learning-by-
exporting include Alvarez and Lopez (2005), Bigsten et al. (2004), Blalock and Gertler (2004), Castellani (2002), 
Fafchamps et al. (2005), Fernandez and Isgut (2005), Girma et al (2004), Kraay (1997), Van Biesebroeck (2005), 
and Zhang (2005).   2
these empirical specifications fail to convincingly isolate the causal effect of exporting on firm 
productivity.  It is easy to imagine ways in which export status could be correlated with 
unobserved firm characteristics that directly influence both the level and growth rate of firm 
productivity.  For example, dynamic firm managers may be more aggressive in entering export 
markets and also be more adept learners or more aggressive in making productivity-enhancing 
investments.  One way to control for selection bias is to jointly estimate an equation for 
participation in export markets using full information maximum likelihood (Clerides et al., 
1998).  However, this more structural approach does not solve the fundamental identification 
problem and may be sensitive to functional form assumptions about the joint error distribution 
(Bigsten et al, 2004).  Another recent approach to reduce selection bias is the use of matching 
estimators (Girma et al., 2004; Fernandez and Isgut, 2005; Zhang, 2005).  Matching can 
eliminate bias caused by selection on observables but cannot address bias associated with 
unobservable firm characteristics. 
Conceptually, the fundamental problem is that non-exporters are an inappropriate 
counterfactual for exporters. One requires a benchmark for how exporters would have performed 
if they had not exported, or if their exports had been lower. A hypothetical randomized 
experiment assessing the impact of exporting on firms might involve randomly assigning shocks 
to export demand across firms. For example, one group of firms might be assigned higher growth 
in the demand for their goods by foreign customers, while a second group would face lower 
growth in foreign demand. In this setting, the impact of exporting would then be easily identified 
by comparing the change in outcomes for the firms experiencing high demand growth for their 
exports with the corresponding change for firms experiencing low growth in demand.  
This study exploits a natural experiment—Chinese exporting during the Asian financial 
crisis—that in key respects approximates the randomized experiment just described. In June 
1997, the devaluation of the Thai baht led to speculative attacks on many other currencies 
worldwide. While the Chinese yuan remained pegged to the US dollar, many important 
destinations for Chinese exports experienced currency depreciations due to the crisis (both 
nominal and real). For instance, between 1995 and 1998, the period investigated in this study, the 
Japanese, Malaysian, and Korean currencies depreciated in real terms against the US dollar by 
31%, 34%, and 43%, respectively. At the other extreme, the British pound and the US dollar 
experienced real appreciations against the yuan, by 14% and 7%. Because the exchange rate   3
changes varied so widely, two observationally equivalent firms faced very different export 
demand shocks if one happened to export its goods to Korea and the other happened to export to 
the U.K. 
The construction of firm-specific exchange rate shocks is made possible by the 
availability of information on firm-specific export country destinations for foreign-invested firms 
in China’s industrial census of 1995.  These data are linked to enterprise survey data for the same 
firms in 1998 and 2000. We use the weighted average real depreciation experienced by a firm’s 
pre-crisis trade partners as an instrument for the change in firm exports from before to after the 
crisis.
3,4  
Because the timing and pattern of devaluations due to the crisis were unforeseen, this 
instrumental variable approach plausibly satisfies the requirement that the instrument (an 
exchange rate shock index) be uncorrelated with the ultimate outcomes of interest except via the 
channel of interest (the change in exports). An attractive aspect of this approach is that exchange 
rate shocks are firm-specific, so we can control for province-sector fixed effects and thus rule out 
bias from unobserved changes affecting specific sectors in each region. Another advantage of our 
study is that China did not suffer from a currency crisis itself during the Asian financial crisis, 
but rather experienced relatively stable economic policies and economic performance during this 
period.
5 
Using this identification strategy, we examine whether and how instrumented changes in 
exports affect measures of firm performance. We find that increases in exports are associated 
with improvements in total factor productivity, as well as improvements in other measures of 
firm performance such as total sales and return on assets. Our estimates indicate that a firm 
experiencing an exogenous 10 percent increase in exports enjoys productivity improvements of 
                                                 
3 Lack of export data at the firm level for 1996 and 1997 requires us to use 1995 as our base year. 
4 This strategy of obtaining exogenous micro-level variation from overseas exchange rate shocks is analogous to the 
approach used in Yang (2006) and Yang (forthcoming), which focus on household-level variation in exchange rate 
shocks experienced by overseas migrants. Earlier papers using exchange rate shocks as exogenous variation include 
Revenga (1992) and Bertrand (2004). 
5 One previous study by Maurin, Thesmar, and Thoenig (2002) uses firm-specific exchange rates as an instrument to 
examine the effect of exporting on the skill intensity of French firms.  The authors use the average real exchange 
rate with respect to 2 currencies (US dollar and German Deutschmark) weighted by EU and non-EU export shares 
prior to the period of study to instrument for the ratio of exports to domestic sales.  With only two exchange rates, 
changes in firm-specific exchange rates could easily be correlated with initial export destination shares if relative 
exchange movements with the US dollar and Deutschmark are persistent. Also, unlike the Asian financial crisis, in 
the French case the extent and cause of exchange rate changes is not clear. The authors do not report first stage 
results and do not examine the effects of exporting on productivity.     4
11% to 13%, or nearly one-eighth (13%) of the sample mean productivity improvement from 
1995 to 2000.  
Additional results provide suggestive evidence that the association between increases in 
exports and productivity improvements reflects “learning by exporting,” for example via inflows 
of advanced technology or production techniques from overseas export customers. We find that 
changes in exports are more positively associated with productivity improvements in firms 
exporting to destinations with higher per capita GDP, which presumably have more advanced 
technologies.  
A crucial question is whether the some unobserved characteristics of firms correlated 
with the exchange rate shocks might be the true causal factor behind the observed productivity 
changes. Firms were not randomly assigned the exchange rate shocks, and so firms experiencing 
better shocks might have experienced differential increases in productivity even in the absence of 
the shock. While we cannot in principle rule out all such concerns, we address this issue by 
gauging the stability of the regression results to accounting for changes in outcomes that are 
correlated with a comprehensive set of firms’ pre-shock characteristics. The estimated impact of 
changes in exports (instrumented by the exchange rate shock) is little changed (and, when the 
outcome of interest is firm productivity, actually becomes larger in magnitude) when a 
comprehensive set of pre-shock firm characteristics are included in regressions. 
The Chinese case is particularly interesting for studying the effect of exporting on firm 
outcomes because in recent years, China’s export growth has been phenomenal and China has 
emerged as one of the world's largest exporters. From 1990 to 2000, Chinese exports nearly 
quadrupled from US$88 billion to US$330 billion.
6 Over this period, China’s export growth rate 
was the sixth highest in the world in the 1990s.
7 By 2000, China had become the world’s 8th 
largest exporter. There also is evidence that during the 1990s the technological sophistication of 
Chinese exports increased substantially (Schott, 2004; Rodrik, 2006). 
This paper is related to other work that has used sudden trade liberalizations or currency 
crises in specific countries as exogenous shocks to firms, comparing firm-level outcomes before 
and after the regime change. Increases in exporting driven by the 1994 Mexican peso crisis have 
                                                 
6US dollar figures are real, base 1995. Export data are from the World Bank's World Development Indicators 2004 
dataset. 
7Only Yemen, South Korea, Ireland, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique had faster export growth. Chinese export 
performance is even more striking given that these other countries started the period from significantly lower base 
levels (with the exception of South Korea, whose export volumes are comparable with China’s).   5
been shown to lead to increases in wage premia and wage inequality that rise with initial 
productivity (Verhoogen 2004, Kaplan and Verhoogen 2005; Fung, 2004). Pavcnik (2002) finds 
that trade liberalization in Chile led to greater productivity improvements in plants that were 
import competing. Our paper differs in that we examine shocks that are heterogeneous across 
firms (unlike the Mexican currency crisis), are not based on potentially endogenous government 
actions (unlike trade liberalizations), and are not caused by major crises or regime changes that 
are likely to be correlated with other economic or policy changes.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief discussion 
of potential causal effects of exporting on firm performance. We provide an overview of our 
empirical strategy in Section 3. In Section 4 we describe our data sources and the construction of 
key variables. We then turn to the first stage regression results in Section 5, and the IV results in 
Section 6. Section 7 describes how the effect of exporting on productivity differs according to 
the income level of firms’ export destinations. Section 8 presents robustness checks and provides 
additional discussion. Section 9 concludes. 
 
2. Pathways for the impact of exports on firm productivity 
The literature has identified a number of channels through which exporting may affect 
firm productivity.  First, overseas buyers may provide technical assistance to exporters to 
improve production efficiency, as suggested by Grossman and Helpman (1991, p. 166) and 
Evenson and Westphal (1995). Westphal, Rhee, and Pursell (1985) document such practices 
among foreign buyers from Korean exporting firms. Second, greater participation in international 
trade could improve firms’ access to knowledge about more advanced production technologies 
(as in the model of Clerides, Lach, and Tybout, 1995) or the willingness of partners in foreign-
invested firms to transfer technology.  Third, higher quality standards in international markets 
compared to domestic markets could provide greater incentives for firms to upgrade production 
technologies (Verhoogen, 2004). Fourth, export participation may lead to faster learning about 
market opportunities for new products or how to tailor products to the specific needs of 
individual buyers (Fafchamps, 2002; Maurin et al, 2002).  Fifth, exporting can increase capacity 
utilization by expanding sales, which also reduces firms’ vulnerability to occasional downturns 
in the domestic market (World Bank 1993).  This latter channel can affect firm productivity 
independent of any learning.    6
Most studies of the link between exporting and firm productivity focus on the extensive 
margin of exporting, asking whether mere participation in the export market affects firm 
outcomes. However, the above pathways could just as easily operate on the intensive margin, 
where firms continue to improve productivity as they expand their export activity.  For example, 
investments in productivity-enhancing technologies might be lumpy, and so firms may wait until 
they reach a certain level of exports before making such investments. Other studies in 
international trade have also examined the intensive margin of exporting. Such studies have 
mostly focused on how productivity gains are related to the number of years that a firm has 
exported.  A number of these studies have found evidence that learning is greater among younger 
firms, consistent with Arrow’s learning-by-doing model (Alvarez and Lopez, 2005; Delgado et 
al., 2003; Fernandez and Isgut, 2005; Girma et al, 2004), while others have found more persistent 
effects (Blalock and Gertler, 2004; Kraay, 1999).  Other studies have examined how firm 
productivity gains are related to export intensity, measured by the share of sales that are exported 
or by the amount of exports after controlling for sales amount.  Again, some have found a 
significantly positive effect of export intensity on productivity growth (Castellani, 2002; Girma 
et al., 2004; Kraay, 1999) while others have found no large or statistically significant relationship 
(Aw et al, 2000; Blalock and Gertler, 2004; Clerides et al., 1998). 
 
3. Empirical approach 
We estimate the impact of exporting on various firm-level outcomes. Consider the 
following regression equation for outcome Yit for firm i observed in year t: 
   Yit  = β Eit  + μi  +  γt  + νit .       ( 1 )  
In equation (1), Eit  is log of export value. μi is a fixed effect for firm i, γt is a year fixed 
effect, and νit is a mean-zero error term. We work with the first-differenced specification of this 
equation to eliminate time-invariant characteristics of firms that may be associated with both 
exports and the outcome variable: 
   ΔYit  = δ + β ΔEit  + εit .       ( 2 )  
Here, δ is a constant equal to the change in year fixed effects (γt−γt-1) and εit is the error 
term, equal to νit-νit-1. Due to the characteristics of the data described below, changes are taken 
between the years 1995 and 1998, and between the years 1995 and 2000. 
A problem with estimating this regression equation via ordinary least-squares is that the   7
coefficient on change in log exports, β, need not represent the causal effect of exports on the 
outcome variable for the reasons described earlier. It is therefore important to isolate a source of 
variation in firms’ exports that is exogenous with respect to firm outcomes. As an instrument for 
firm exports, we use an exchange rate shock index defined as the weighted average real currency 
depreciation experienced by the firm’s pre-crisis trade partners, derived explicitly below. We 
posit that firms whose trade-partner countries experienced larger depreciations should see larger 
declines in exports. Our strategy, then, is to examine whether and how these instrumented 
changes in exports are associated with changes in firm performance.  
A simple version of the first stage regression equation is: 
  ΔEit  = α0 + α1 SHOCKINDEXi98  + ψit .      ( 3 )  
Here, α0 is a constant term and ψit is a mean-zero error term. Because the impact of the exchange 
rate shocks on changes in firm exports may vary across firms with differing initial 
characteristics, we also examine a first stage equation where the shock index is interacted with a 
vector of 1995 firm characteristics Wi95, which are also separately included as regressors:  
ΔEit  = α0 + α1 SHOCKINDEXi98 + β `(SHOCKINDEXi98  * W i95) + γ`W i95 + ψit .   (4) 
The predicted value of the change in exports from the first stage, PredΔEit, is used instead 
of ΔEit in the second-stage regression: 
   ΔYit  = δ + β PredΔEit  + γ`W i95 + εit .      ( 5 )  
As is standard using 2SLS, coefficient standard errors are adjusted to account for the fact that the 
regressor is a predicted value. For β to be an unbiased estimate of the impact of the change in log 
exports on the change in the outcome variable, it must be true that the instrument only affects the 
dependent variable via the endogenous independent variable (the change in log exports), and not 
through any other channel. We address and provide evidence against potential violations of this 
exclusion restriction in Section 7 below.  
In addition, for β to be an unbiased estimate it must also be true that the instrument for 
exports, the shock index, is not correlated with ongoing time trends or other shocks affecting 
changes in firm performance. The assumption is violated if firms exporting to countries that 
experienced greater depreciations were different from other firms with respect to unobserved 
initial (pre-shock) characteristics, and if changes in the outcomes would have varied according to 
these same characteristics even in the absence of the exchange rate shocks. 
To control for this possibility, we include a vector of pre-crisis (1995) firm characteristics   8
Xi95 on the right-hand-side of the estimating equation:
8 
   ΔYit  = δ + β PredΔEit  + ω`X i95 + εit .   (6) 
This vector of pre-crisis firm characteristics includes firm variables for 1994 as well as 
1995 in order to control for differences in initial levels as well as pre-shock trends.  In order to 
verify whether the regression results are in fact contaminated by changes associated with pre-
crisis firm characteristics, we examine whether the estimates are qualitatively similar when we 
exclude the vector of pre-crisis characteristics from the regressions.
9  It turns out that many of 
the control variables predict both the magnitude of exchange rate shocks and changes in firm 
performance, but that the estimated effects of exports on outcome variables are relatively 
insensitive to the inclusion of the controls.
10  
In many contexts positive correlation in the error terms across similar observations biases 
standard errors downwards (Moulton 1986). In the context of our study, there could be 
correlation among the shocks experienced among firms exporting to the same or similar 
locations. We therefore report standard errors that account for arbitrary covariance structures 
within clusters, where we define a cluster as all firms reporting the same primary (largest) export 
destination.  
 
4. Data sources and key variable definitions 
The firm-level data used in this paper come from two datasets maintained by China’s 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Data for 1995 come from China’s decennial industrial 
                                                 
8 Xi95 includes the vector of variables interacted with the shock index, Wi95. The analogous first-stage equation 
predicting the change in log exports also necessarily includes the full set of control variables Xi95.  
9 The vector of pre-crisis control variables includes: fixed effects for province-industry combinations (of which there 
are between 300-400 depending on the specification); 1995 log sales income; 1994 log sales income; 1995 share of 
exports to top two destinations; indicator for firm existing in 1994; indicator for firm exporting in 1994; foreign 
share of ownership; log of industry weighted average exports to 1995 destinations (weighted by firm's 1995 export 
destinations), separately for 1993 and 1996; indicator variables for firm size categories; 1995 exports as share of 
firm sales; 1994 exports as share of firm sales; indicator for firm exporting entire output in 1995; log exports in 
1995; log exports in 1994; 1995 log capital-labor ratio; 1995 fraction of firm exports destined for Hong Kong; and 
log 1995 weighted average per capita GDP in firm's export destinations (weighted by firm's 1995 exports). 
10 Appendix Table 1 presents coefficient estimates from regressions of the firm’s exchange rate shock on a number 
of pre-shock (1995) firm characteristics. The first regression presents coefficient estimates without including 
province-industry fixed effects, and the second regression includes these fixed effects. Several individual variables 
are statistically significantly different from zero in both regressions, indicating that firms’ export destinations 
experienced greater depreciations if their industry had smaller log exports to those destinations, their industry 
experienced greater growth (from 1993-1995) in exports to those destinations, the firm exported a higher share of its 
total exports to its top two destinations, the firm exported to higher income destinations, and the firm had higher 
capital per worker.    9
census, while data for 1998 and 2000 come from NBS’s annual industrial enterprise survey. The 
1995 industrial census includes detailed data on all firms belonging to the township 
administrative level or above.
11 The annual industrial enterprise survey, on the other hand, 
includes firms with annual sales income above five million yuan, regardless of administrative 
level. Provision of survey information by firms is compulsory under Chinese law, and local 
statistical bureau offices require that firms verify or correct data that is suspected of being 
inaccurate. Unfortunately, in 1996 and 1997, data was only kept for a subsample of very large 
enterprises, making data from those years unsuitable for analysis.   
The 1995 industrial census required firms to report a full set of firm accounting data on 
revenue, expenditures, exports, investment (including R&D investment), labor, capital, and 
intermediate inputs. In addition, foreign and joint venture firms (but not other firms) were asked 
to identify their top two export destination countries, and the value of exports to each. In the 
annual industrial enterprise survey, firms report similar accounting information, but provide no 
information on trading partners. Each firm in the two data sources has a unique identifier code, 
so it is possible to link observations across years to create a firm panel dataset.  
Because the key innovation of this paper involves constructing exchange rate shocks 
from information on firms’ export destinations prior to the 1997 Asian financial crisis, we focus 
our analysis on foreign and joint venture firms (those with a positive foreign ownership share) 
that had positive exports in 1995.  
All economic variables are expressed in real 1995 terms using province-level producer 
price indices obtained from the NBS. In 1997 and 1998, provincial-level producer price indices 
(PPIs) are used as deflators.  In 1996, only a national producer price index is available, which we 
adjust to each province based on province-specific trends.
12  Real exchange rate data for 
destination countries of Chinese exports were constructed using nominal exchange rates and 
consumer price indices obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2004 for 
                                                 
11 Data is for firms, not establishments. All firms in China are supervised by a specific administrative level of 
government. China’s administrative structure includes the following geographic levels, from largest to smallest: 
provinces, prefectures, counties, townships, and villages.  Cities are divided into districts and neighborhoods.  The 
1995 industrial census also collected some basic information on village-level firms, but the level of detail was 
insufficient for analysis. 
12 We regress provincial PPIs for the years 1997 to 2003 on the national PPI, provincial consumer price indices 
(CPIs), and provincial retail price indices (RPIs), and include provincial fixed effects.  The provincial CPIs and RPIs 
do not increase the fit of these regressions, so coefficients from a parsimonious specification with the national PPI 
and provincial fixed effects are used to estimate provincial PPIs in 1996.    10
all countries except Taiwan. Nominal exchange rate data for Taiwan come from Bloomberg, 
L.P., while the Taiwanese CPI was obtained from the Statistical Bureau of the Republic of China 
(http://eng.stat.gov.tw). 
The analysis also makes use of disaggregated export data for China and re-export data for 
Hong Kong from the UN Comtrade dataset.  
One might worry that restricting the sample to foreign-invested firms reduces somewhat 
the generalizability of our results. However, FDI firms account for a large and increasing share 
of exports both in China and throughout the world. Foreign-invested firms accounted for 31.5 
percent of total Chinese exports in 1995, 44.1 percent in 1998, and 57.1 percent in 2004 (China 
Statistical Yearbook, 2005).  Most Chinese exports are processed exports tied to vertical 
production networks; since 1995 processed exports have accounted for the majority of China’s 
total exports (Lemoine and Unal-Kesenci, 2004).  This type of trade, especially in intermediate 
inputs, accounts for a large share of the recent growth in world trade (Hummels et al., 2001), and 
much of it is controlled by multinationals.  For instance, in the United States, multinationals 
account for over half of total exports (Slaughter, 2000). 
Also, in the Chinese context, because many Chinese domestic firms were publicly owned 
during the period of study, restricting attention to the more market-oriented foreign-invested 
firms may actually make our results better reflect the effects of exporting in open market 
environments prevalent elsewhere and so make the results more generalizable. 
  Still, it is important to consider the ways in which learning by FDI firms might differ 
from learning by domestic firms.   It could be the case that learning opportunities from exporting 
are less for foreign-invested firms because foreign investors provide state-of-the-art technology.  
Indeed, there is considerable evidence that FDI firms have higher productivity than domestic 
firms throughout East Asia, including China (Hallward-Driemeier et al, 2002).  In that case, we 
would expect FDI firms to exhibit less learning than domestic firms, and so our estimates could 
be interpreted as lower bounds.  However, many aspects of learning are likely to be similar for 
FDI and domestic firms, especially when the export destination country is not the same as the 
source of the FDI. It is also plausible that foreign ownership is complementary to learning-by-
exporting if foreign partners put pressure on export partners to transfer technology to suppliers or 
invest in the firm’s learning capacity. 
4.1 Defining firm-specific exchange rate shocks   11
We use the weighted average real depreciation experienced by a firm’s pre-crisis trade 
partners as an instrument for the change in firm exports between 1995 and 1998. Two steps are 
involved in creating this variable. First, the change in the real exchange rate is constructed for 
each trading partner country. Let the set of all Chinese export destination countries be indexed by 
j (from 1 to J). For each destination j, the change in the real exchange rate vis-à-vis the Chinese 
yuan is:  
  ()( ) ( ) ( ) 98 98 98 95 95 ln ln ln ln jj j j j ERCHANGE E P E P ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ =− −− ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ , (7) 
where Ejt is the nominal exchange rate (currency units per yuan) and Pjt is the price level 
(consumer price index) for destination j in year t.
13 
The second step is to construct a firm-level exchange rate shock variable. Let firms be 
indexed by i, and let si1 be the 1995 share of firm i's exports that went to its top destination 
country, and let si2 be the share exported to the second most important destination country.
14 The 
firm-level real exchange rate shock measure is: 
SHOCKINDEXi98  = si1ERCHANGE1,98  + si2ERCHANGE2,98      (8) 
In other words, for a firm exporting to just one country j in 1995, the shock index is 
simply ERCHANGE1,98. For firms exporting to more than one foreign country in 1995, that 
firm’s shock index is the weighted average real exchange rate change across those destination 
countries, with each destination’s exchange rate change weighted by the share of 1995 exports 
going to that country. It is important that the shock index is defined solely on the basis of export 
destinations prior to the 1997 crisis, to eliminate concerns that export destinations might be 
endogenous to the shock. For instance, firms might shift the composition of their exports to 
destinations experiencing better exchange rate shocks. 
We modify the shock index when firms report Hong Kong as one of their export 
destinations, which is the case for 47.4% of firms. Nearly all Chinese exports to Hong Kong are 
re-exported (Feenstra and Hanson, 2002), so that the relevant exchange rate change is not with 
respect to the Hong Kong dollar, but rather with respect to the ultimate export destination. 
                                                 
13 The calculation does not take into account the change in the Chinese domestic price level because this will not 
vary across firms and so will be accounted for by the constant term in the empirical analysis. 
14 Because the survey only asks about firms’ top two export destinations, we construct these shares ignoring any 
exports going to countries beyond the top two. In practice, this is not a very important assumption because firms’ 
exports turn out to be highly concentrated by destination. In 1995, 77.4% of firms export to only a single country, 
83.7% export to no more than two, and in 91.6% of firms exports to the top two destinations make up three-quarters 
or more of total exports.   12
However, firms do not report the ultimate destination of their shipments to Hong Kong.
15 We 
therefore assume that any shipments to Hong Kong are distributed to third countries in 
proportions equivalent to the distribution of Hong Kong re-exports of products in the firm’s 
industrial sector.
16 We then use Hong Kong re-export destination shares by sector to construct 
weighted average real exchange rate shocks by sector, and assign the sector-specific shock index 
to the portion of each firm’s exports that go to Hong Kong.  
Formally, the real exchange rate change for Hong Kong re-exports in sector m is taken to 
be: 






= ∑ , (9) 
where kmj95 is the share of re-exports destined for country j in Hong Kong’s total re-exports of 
sector m in 1995. ERCHANGEj98 is as defined before. This sector-specific real exchange rate 
change for Hong Kong is then used for firms in sector m in calculating SHOCKINDEXi98.  
4.2 Productivity measurement 
Firm-level productivity is a primary outcome of interest in our analysis. We consider two 
types of productivity measures: an OLS estimator and the estimator proposed by Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2003) that corrects for bias due to the endogeneity of inputs with respect to productivity. 
The OLS estimator assumes that the production technology is Cobb-Douglas, and is 
based on estimation of the following OLS regression equation: 
yit = β0 + βl lit + βk kit  + εit        (10) 
where yit is log value added,
17 lit is log number of employees, kit is log fixed assets, and εit is a 
mean-zero error term. The residual from this regression is the log of productivity, which we 
denote θit 
OLS for firm i in year t. We use the pooled sample data for 1995, 1998, and 2000.  
A problem with the OLS productivity estimator is that it is based on coefficient estimates 
on capital and labor and that are likely to be biased. Of particular concern is the possibility that 
firms with higher productivity will have different input usage than firms with lower productivity 
                                                 
15 Indeed, they may not even know exactly the ultimate destination of their shipments to Hong Kong if their 
products are sold to trading companies who later decide where shipments are re-exported. 
16 We define 24 sectors that are groupings of HS (1992) 2-digit industries into the sector categories used in the 
Chinese industry classification system. 
17 Value added is explicitly reported in the annual industrial enterprise survey data. In the 1995 Industrial Census, 
value added is calculated as current revenue minus intermediate inputs plus value-added tax. For both the OLS and 
LP productivity estimators, we replace zero and negative values of value added with 1 before taking logs. This 
adjustment is necessary for roughly 10 percent of firms. Regression results are robust to excluding firms with zero or 
negative value added.    13
(Olley and Pakes 1996, Levinsohn and Petrin 2003). This will lead to biased estimates of the 
coefficients on capital and labor that cannot be definitively signed in advance. Thus the OLS 
productivity estimator will be biased as well. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (henceforth LP) 
propose an estimator that uses intermediate inputs as proxies for productivity, in contrast to the 
Olley and Pakes (1996) estimator which uses investment as a proxy. The LP estimator has the 
advantage that intermediate inputs are typically reported for most firms, while investment is 
often zero in datasets of developing country firms. Intermediate inputs also may respond more 
smoothly to productivity shocks, while adjustment costs may keep investment from responding 
fully to such shocks. We calculate the LP log productivity estimate, θit 
LP, using intermediate 
inputs as the proxy variable.
18 In the regressions, we examine the total change in productivity 
from 1995 to either 1998 or 2000 rather than an annualized productivity measure. 
 
5. The impact of exchange rate shocks on exports   
Figure 1 displays monthly exchange rates for selected major Chinese export destinations 
expressed in Chinese yuan per unit of foreign currency (normalized to 1 in January 1995).
19 A 
decline in a particular country’s exchange rate should be considered a negative shock to firms 
exporting to that location: each unit of foreign currency would be convertible to fewer Chinese 
yuan, making Chinese goods more expensive in real terms. 
In the mid-1990s, Chinese exchange rates with other currencies were for the most part 
quite stable. The largest changes occurred after the start of the Asian financial crisis in July 1997. 
In particular, real exchange rates in Thailand and Korea plummeted dramatically in that month. 
In other countries, the changes were less dramatic, and sometimes followed slightly different 
time patterns. Japan, for example, experienced more modest real depreciation through 1998, and 
then recovered. The German exchange rate actually dipped prior to the crisis, in January 1997. 
Exchange rate changes in several other major European destinations of Chinese exports (such as 
France, Belgium, and the Netherlands) closely track Germany’s and so are not shown on the 
graph. 
In Table 1, we describe the magnitude of real exchange rate changes and export growth 
between 1995 and 1998 for China’s top 20 export partner countries using Chinese export data as 
                                                 
18 We use the estimator implemented as a Stata command and described by Petrin, Levinsohn, and Poi (2003). 
19 The exchange rates in the figure are as of the end of each month, and were obtained from Bloomberg L.P.   14
reported in the UN Comtrade dataset.  Exports to each country include the value of both direct 
exports to the country and re-exports from Hong Kong. 
Among the top twenty trading partners, the four countries whose real exchange rates with 
respect to the Chinese yuan experienced the largest depreciations were Indonesia (90 percent), 
Korea (43 percent), Malaysia (34 percent), and Thailand (32 percent).  These were also the four 
country destinations with the largest reductions in Chinese exports from 1995 to 1998. Exports to 
Indonesia declined by 90 percent, to Korea by 30 percent, to Malaysia by 32 percent, and to 
Thailand by 40 percent.  In contrast, exports increased to all countries whose currencies with 
respect to the yuan appreciated.  The fastest export growth rates were to Brazil (42 percent), the 
USA (36 percent), Spain (32 percent), and Italy (29 percent).  Of these countries, only Spain’s 
currency depreciated, slightly by 11 percent.   
Figure 2 provides a graphical view of export changes for the same 20 countries, in 
ascending order of 1995-1998 real exchange rate devaluation (from left to right, top to bottom). 
Each graph displays log exports from 1990-2004, where exports are normalized so that the first 
year is 100 before taking logs, and all graphs have the same vertical scale. Changes in Chinese 
exports from 1995-1998 are indeed more negative in countries experiencing real exchange rate 
devaluations (in the bottom row) than in those experiencing real exchange rate appreciations (top 
row). These graphs are also useful to confirm that post-1997 declines in exports in the countries 
experiencing the largest depreciations are not just continuations of pre-existing negative export 
trends. In fact, the opposite appears to be true: pre-crisis exports were actually growing robustly 
prior to 1997 in Japan, Thailand, Malaysia, Korea, and Indonesia, and then took sharp downward 
dips thereafter.  
Regression-based estimates of the impact of 1995-1998 real exchange rate changes on 
changes in exports over the same time period are presented in Table 2. In the first column, the 
unit of observation is exports to one of 153 Chinese export destinations. Data are from the UN 
COMTRADE dataset. Hong Kong re-exports are treated as exports from China to their 
respective destinations. We regress the change in log total export value on the shock index for 
the destination, and weight each observation by 1995 total exports so that the estimated 
relationship is not heavily influenced by exports to relatively unimportant destinations. The 
coefficient on the shock index (-0.632) is negative and highly statistically significant. The R-
squared of the regression (0.45) is quite high as well, indicating that real exchange rate changes   15
account for a substantial fraction of the variation in Chinese exports by destination over this time 
period. 
The COMTRADE data also provide information on quantities, enabling us to look 
separately at the effect of exchange rate shocks on changes in quantities and changes in unit 
values. Unit values could adjust if firms price to market by cutting prices and reducing markups 
when the Chinese yuan appreciates with respect to the currencies of their export destinations. 
Such behavior has been found in other studies (Katayama, Lu, and Tybout 2005; Atkeson and 
Burstein, 2005), and could lead us to overstate the impact of exports on productivity, if more 
favorable exchange rate shocks raise exporters’ markups, and thus measured productivity, 
without increasing the ability of the firm to produce a greater quantity of goods with the same 
amount of inputs. Changes in unit values also could reflect changes in product quality (Hallak, 
2004).
20 
We therefore run regressions at the level of the product-destination (exports of HS 6-digit 
products to specific destinations), of which there are close to 88,000 in the COMTRADE data for 
Chinese exports. In the second column of the table, the dependent variable is the change in log 
total value of exports (analogous to the dependent variable in the first regression, except at a 
much higher level of disaggregation). As in the first column, the coefficient on the shock index is 
negative and highly statistically significant. The coefficient (-1.042) indicates that a 10 percent 
depreciation of a foreign currency versus the Chinese yuan reduces exports to that country by 
10.4 percent.  While the coefficient in the second column is roughly two-thirds larger in 
magnitude than the coefficient in the first column, the standard error on the second column’s 
estimate is large enough that the null hypothesis that the two coefficients are identical cannot be 
rejected.
21 
The third and fourth columns of the table examine the impact of the exchange rate shock 
on the change in log export unit value and change in log export quantity, respectively. We find 
that nearly all of the change in export value in response to exchange rate shocks results from 
changes in quantities rather than changes in unit values.  In the export unit value regression the 
coefficient on the shock index is negative, but is relatively small in magnitude (-0.161) and is 
                                                 
20 Earlier studies (e.g., Pavcnik, 2002) do not deal with the markup issue. 
21 The R-squared in the second column has also dropped dramatically vis-à-vis the first column, which is likely due 
to the fact that more factors must come into play to explain variation in exports at the detailed product-destination 
level than are relevant for aggregate exports to countries as a whole.    16
only statistically significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level. In the export quantity 
regression, by contrast, the coefficient on the shock index is relatively large in magnitude (-
0.881) and is statistically significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. These results 
suggest that 15.5% (0.161 divided by 1.042) of the total change in export value caused by 
exchange rate shocks can be attributed to changes in unit values.  
We conduct a similar analysis using the firm data.  In this case, we are unable to 
distinguish between quantities and unit values.  However, with firm data, we are able to control 
for a large number of additional control variables, and we are able to examine interactions 
between the shock index and various firm characteristics.  
Summary statistics for the firm data are provided in Table 3. In the main results tables, 
we focus on results for a balanced sample of 3,339 firms that are observed continuously across 
the 1995, 1998, and 2000 surveys.
22 The mean firm exhibited substantial export growth: the 
mean changes in log exports across firms are 0.45 and 0.49 over the 1995-1998 and 1995-2000 
periods, respectively. In addition to these mean changes, it is also worth noting that most firms 
experienced increases in exports from before to after the crisis. Between 1995 and 1998, 65.5% 
of firms had positive export growth, and the corresponding figure for 1995-2000 is very similar, 
65.0%. We emphasize this to note that the natural experiment in this paper occurred in a period 
of overall export growth, so that the exogenous fluctuations in exporting we identify mostly lead 
to lower-than-expected positive growth, instead of driving firms into negative growth.
23  
Regressions examining the impact of the shock index (and associated interaction terms) 
on the change in firm-level log exports are presented in Table 4. To ease the interpretation of 
regression coefficients, the shock index and all variables interacted with it are standardized to 
have mean zero and standard deviation one.  
All regressions include province-industry fixed effects and the full set of pre-shock 
control variables described above. The first two columns present results for changes between 
1995 and 1998, and the last two columns present results for changes between 1995 and 2000. 
                                                 
22 Results are qualitatively very similar for unbalanced samples of firms (when the 1995-1998 sample is allowed to 
differ from the 1995-2000 sample), as will be discussed in more detail below. 
23 We tested whether the effect of the instrumented change in log exports is different when that change is negative 
(results available on request). The results suggest that for firms with negative export growth the effect of exports on 
productivity is more muted or nonexistent (coefficients are closer to zero and not significant). However, standard 
errors are large due to the relatively small number of firms with negative export growth (we also cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the effect of export changes on productivity is symmetric for positive and negative changes), and so 
strong conclusions cannot be made on this front.   17
When the shock index is entered into the regression without interaction terms (columns 1 
and 3), its coefficient estimate is negative, but it is only statistically significant in the first 
column for 1995-1998 changes. In both these regressions, the F-test of the statistical significance 
of the shock index yields relatively low F-statistics (of 4.73 and 1.12, respectively), indicating 
that the shock index by itself would be a somewhat weak instrument.  
To gain a graphical sense of the relationship between the shock index and the changes on 
log exports, we examine the nonparametric relationship between the two variables after 
partialing out the influence of other covariates.  In Figure 3, we display the relationship along 
with confidence interval bands, using a locally weighted regression estimator.  The figure reveals 
a negative relationship between the two variables over both the 1995-1998 and 1995-2000 
periods. The relationship appears somewhat flatter for the 1995-2000 period, particularly in the 
middle range of exchange rate shock values (with higher density of observations in the firm 
data), helping to explain the lack of statistical significance on the shock index in the 1995-2000 
regression of column 3 in Table 4. 
In columns 2 and 4 of the table, the shock index is interacted with several 1995 firm 
characteristics: the log of weighted per capita GDP in the firm’s export destinations (with export 
shares as weights), the fraction of firm exports destined for Hong Kong, the foreign ownership 
share, log capital per worker, log sales, and log productivity (Levinsohn-Petrin). Justification for 
the exogeneity of the interaction terms stems from the unanticipated nature of the exchange rate 
shocks and the predetermined nature of firm characteristics measured in 1995. 
Across both regressions, coefficients on the interaction term with foreign ownership share 
are positive in sign and are statistically significantly different from zero at conventional levels. 
When firms’ export partners experience exchange rate devaluations, exports decline less in firms 
with greater foreign ownership shares. This may reflect the fact that exports in such firms are 
more likely to be destined for overseas owners or firms otherwise linked in some way to the 
Chinese exporters so that exports are less price-elastic. For example, exports of firms with higher 
foreign ownership may frequently be part of global within-firm production processes, so that 
their export demand may be insensitive to relatively large exchange rate fluctuations.
24 
Multinationals also may use financial instruments to hedge against exchange rate risk. In the 
                                                 
24 We regard exploring these hypotheses (and others) explaining heterogeneity in the impact of exchange rate shocks 
on firm exports as important avenues for future research.   18
1995-1998 regression, the shock index also has a less negative effect on firms that have higher 
capital-labor ratios. 
F-statistics for the test of the joint significance of the shock index and associated 
interaction terms in columns 2 and 4 (10.09 and 6.88, respectively) are substantially larger than 
the corresponding F-statistics in columns 1 and 3, suggesting that including the interaction terms 
in the set of instruments is desirable to reduce weak-instrument problems (Bound, Jaeger, and 
Baker 1995).
25 
The coefficients on the shock index and associated interaction terms, combined with the 
shock index and 1995 characteristics of each firm, can be used to calculate the firm-specific 
predicted changes in log exports associated with the exchange rate shocks. In 1995-1998, the 
mean predicted impact of the exchange rate shock is -0.019, with a standard deviation of 0.077. 
In 1995-2000, the mean is -0.011 and the standard deviation is 0.082. This amount of variation is 
non-negligible: a two-standard-deviation difference in the predicted change in log exports is 
roughly 16 percentage points over either time period.
26 In the regression results to follow, we 
discuss the magnitude of the IV estimates by describing the estimated impact of a 10 percent 
increase in exports, which is roughly 1.25 standard deviations of the predicted change in exports 
driven by the exchange rate shocks. 
 
6. The impact of exporting on firm performance  
  To analyze the effect of exporting on firm performance, we regress the change in various 
firm performance measures on the change in log exports. Table 5 presents OLS and IV 
regression estimates of the coefficient on the change in log exports, separately for the 1995-1998  
(top panel of table) and 1995-2000 periods (bottom panel). The dependent variables are all in 
first-differences, and are listed across the top of the table. As in the first stage regressions, we 
control for province-sector fixed effects and a vector of pre-crisis control variables in all 
regressions. In the IV regressions, the first-stage equations are those in Table 4, columns 2 and 4 
                                                 
25 However, these instruments are still relatively weak given the F-statistic thresholds recommended by Stock and 
Yogo (2005) for avoiding size distortions in IV estimation. As a robustness check, we present below instrumental 
variable estimates with standard errors and 5% significance tests based on Andrews, Moreira, and Stock 
(forthcoming), who provide a method for adjusting critical values of test statistics in the presence of weak 
instruments so that significance tests have the correct size. 
26 That said, this variation is relatively small in comparison with the mean and standard deviation of the change in 
ln(exports) from Table 3: mean 0.45 (standard deviation 1.26) in 1995-1998, and mean 0.49 (standard deviation 
1.44) over 1995-2000.   19
(for the 1995-1998 and 1995-2000 periods, respectively.)  
  Overall, we find strong evidence that increases in exporting lead to increases in firm 
productivity.  For both the OLS and LP productivity measures, the IV estimate of the impact of 
the change in exports is positive and statistically significantly different from zero over both the 
1995-1998 and the 1995-2000 time periods. The coefficient estimates in regressions using the 
1995-2000 period are slightly larger in magnitude than those for the 1995-1998 period. However, 
standard errors are large enough that one cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficients are the 
same across the two time periods. 
In interpreting the coefficient on the change in export value when using the exchange rate 
shock as an instrument, the estimated effect of exports on productivity may partially reflect the 
small fraction of the change in export value attributable to changes in unit values (or markups). 
The previous analysis of Chinese trade data (see columns 2-4 of Table 2) indicates that 15.5% of 
the increase in export values associated with the exchange rate shocks are due to changes in unit 
values. Therefore, we consider 84.5% of the estimated change in productivity caused by changes 
in export value to be a true change in productivity. 
  These productivity effects are not extremely large, but neither are they negligible. The 
regression results in Table 5 indicate that a 10 percent increase in exports (0.1 increase in log 
exports) leads to a 0.108 (84.5% of 0.1273) increase in log OLS productivity and a 0.126 (84.5% 
of 0.1485) increase in log LP productivity over the 1995-2000 period. These numbers can be 
compared to mean productivity improvements over 1995-2000, which were 0.83 for OLS 
productivity and 0.95 for LP productivity (Table 3). So a 10 percent increase in exports leads to 
OLS and LP productivity improvements equal to roughly one-eighth (13%) of the mean 
productivity improvement over the time period. 
  Consistent with the positive productivity effects of exporting, we also find statistically 
significant positive effects of exporting on sales and on return on assets over both time periods.  
There is also a positive and significant effect on sales per worker in the 1995-1998 sample, but 
this effect declines in magnitude (but remains statistically significantly different from zero at the 
10% level) in the 1995-2000 sample. According to the IV coefficient estimates, a 10 percent 
increase in exports increases sales by 6-7 percent (over both time periods), and return on assets 
by 0.96 percentage points from 1995-1998 and by 0.68 percentage points from 1995-2000.   
  In regressions for workers and capital, IV coefficient estimates are not statistically   20
significantly different from zero in the 1995-1998 sample (and are actually negative in sign). In 
the 1995-2000 sample the coefficients in the workers and capital regressions are positive and 
statistically significant at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. Firms hire more capital and labor 
in response to increases in exports over the 1995-2000 period. Capital and labor respond quite 
similarly (coefficient estimates in the capital and worker regressions are very similar), so the 
capital-worker ratio exhibits little relationship with the change in exports in the IV regressions. 
The difference in results for the change in capital and labor over the two time periods suggests 
firms have difficulty adjusting capital and labor stocks in the short run (1995-1998), but not in 
the longer run (1995-2000).  The lack of short-term response supports the assumption that 
exchange rate changes were unanticipated.  
  The instrumented change in exports has a positive and statistically significant effect on 
total wages per worker in the 1995-1998 period, while in the 1995-2000 period this effect is 
smaller in magnitude but still statistically significant. Although the difference in the effects for 
the two periods is not statistically significant, it is consistent with the need for firms to pay 
workers more in the shorter term to compensate them for greater effort or productivity when 
output increases in response to export demand but the number of workers and the amount of 
capital is unchanged.  The lack of significant changes in labor and capital in the short term 
suggests that  initial productivity effects are associated with process innovations rather than 
technology embodied in new capital. Finally, increases in exports are associated with statistically 
significant increases in the share of firm ownership that is held by foreigners in the 1995-2000 
period, but not in the 1995-1998 period. Firms may become more attractive to potential foreign 
investors when they experience exogenous improvements in exports (and thus improvements in 
other firm performance measures). As with the worker and capital outcomes, it is reasonable that 
this effect appears with some lag.  
For nearly all dependent variables in Table 5, IV estimates of the coefficient on log 
exports are larger in magnitude than the OLS estimates. The difference is proportionately 
greatest in the productivity regressions. For example, in the regression for LP productivity in 
1995-2000, the OLS coefficient on the change in log exports is 0.382, but in the IV regression 
the coefficient is 1.485. The large difference between IV and OLS is also evident in the 
regressions for wages/worker, which is sometimes used as an alternative measure of firm 
productivity.   21
  What might explain larger coefficient magnitudes in the IV results? One possibility is 
that the OLS estimates in the productivity regressions are biased by omitted variables that lead to 
increases in firm scale (including increases in exports) but that have minimal or negative 
productivity effects. For example, firms undergoing mergers with other firms, or rapidly 
expanding their production facilities, would exhibit simultaneous increases in various indicators 
of firm scale, such as sales, workers, and capital, as well as exports. Mergers or expansion 
activity may have a temporary negative effect on productivity (due to, say, inefficiencies during 
reorganization of production lines), biasing downwards the OLS coefficient on the change in 
exports in the productivity regressions.  
Classical measurement error in the export variable is not likely to be an important 
explanation for the differences between the OLS and IV results. To test for measurement error 
bias, we estimate 1995-2000 IV regressions using the 1995-1998 change in log exports as the 
instrument for the 1995-2000 change in log exports. If attenuation bias due to classical 
measurement error is important, the IV coefficient estimates should be larger than the OLS 




7. Do the results reflect “learning-by-exporting”? 
  Exporting may raise firm productivity by raising firms’ exposure to technological or 
institutional advances in their export destinations, perhaps via communication with foreign 
buyers.
28 If this were the case, then we should expect the impact of exporting to be larger when 
firms export to more developed countries.  
To test this hypothesis, we use the per capita GDP of an export destination as a proxy for 
the destination’s level of technological and institutional development.We estimate IV regressions 
of the change in productivity on the change in exports, where we include an interaction term 
between the change in log exports and log per capita GDP of the firm’s export destinations. 
Here, as before, the change in log exports is instrumented with the shock index and associated 
interaction terms (as in Table 4). For brevity, let Zi be the vector that includes the shock index 
                                                 
27 For example, the coefficients in the OLS and IV regressions for productivity (LP) are 0.456 and 0.512 
respectively. Regression results for other dependent variables are available from the authors upon request. 
28 In a study of French firms, MacGarvie (2006) finds that exporters tend to obtain new technology from abroad by 
analyzing competing products and through communication with foreign buyers.   22
and the set of associated interaction terms in Table 4. In addition, the interaction term 
Δln(exports) * (initial period log per capita GDP in destinations) is itself instrumented with the 
interactions of the original instruments with destination log per capita GDP, or Zi * (log per 
capita GDP in destinations).  
IV regression results for the two productivity measures are presented in the first two 
columns of Table 6. For ease of interpretation, destination log per capita GDP is normalized to 
have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. The coefficient on Δln(exports) * (log per capita GDP in 
destinations) is positive and statistically significantly different from zero at the 10% level in 
regressions for both productivity outcomes. Both regressions imply that a one-standard-deviation 
increase in log per capita income level of a firm’s export destinations leads to an increase of 
about 0.18 in the impact of Δln(exports) on the change in firm productivity.  
While these regression results support the hypothesis that exporting to more developed 
countries leads to higher productivity gains, one might raise omitted variable concerns: it could 
be that per capita GDP in a firm’s export destinations is simply proxying for other correlated 
firm characteristics that are the true sources of heterogeneity in the productivity impact of 
exporting.  
To test whether such omitted variable concerns are important, we run additional 
regressions that include several additional interactions between Δln(exports) and initial 1995 
firm characteristics: the share of exports destined for Hong Kong, the share of firm ownership 
that is foreign, ln(capital/worker), ln(sales), and ln(productivity, LP). Each of these interaction 
terms is instrumented by a set of variables analogous to those in the first two columns of the 
table. For example, Δln(exports) * (% of exports to Hong Kong) is instrumented with Zi * (% of 
exports to Hong Kong). 
Results are presented in the last two columns of the table. As it turns out, inclusion of the 
additional interaction terms leads the coefficient on Δln(exports) * (log per capita GDP in 
destinations) to more than double in magnitude. The new regressions imply that a one-standard-
deviation increase in the income level of a firm’s export destinations leads to a nearly 0.4 
increase in the impact of Δln(exports) on the change in firm productivity. The fact that the 
coefficient rises substantially in magnitude with the inclusion of the additional interaction terms 
suggests that, if anything, omitted variables bias leads the coefficient on Δln(exports) * (log per 
capita GDP in destinations) to be understated. Overall, then, the results are consistent with   23
exporting leading to productivity improvements via inflows of advanced technological or 
institutional knowledge from more developed countries.  
Coefficients on some of the other statistically significant interaction terms are also worth 
noting. In response to exogenous increases in exports, firms experience greater productivity 
growth when they have lower initial capital per worker, greater initial sales, and lower initial 
productivity. Scale may matter if small firms are unable to make R&D investments or if there are 
other scale economies to productivity improvement, while firms with lower initial productivity 
and less capital intensity may simply have more room for improvement in productivity.  
In both regressions, the coefficient on the interaction term with share of exports to Hong 
Kong is negative although not statistically significant. This may be due to the fact that 
technological inflows may be attenuated when a Hong Kong-based trading company mediates 
trade flows between a Chinese firm and its ultimate destination. 
  
8. Robustness checks 
  In this section we attempt to shed further light on the nature of the impact of exporting on 
firm outcomes. In doing so, we refer to previous tables and also provide additional regression-
based evidence.  
  8.1. Are productivity improvements simply due to increases in capacity utilitization? 
  An important question when interpreting the estimated effect of exporting on firm 
productivity is whether the relationship simply reflects changes in capacity utilization. This 
concern arises if firms are unable to change their capital stocks and labor forces in response to a 
reduction in export demand. Then reductions in exports (and thus total firm sales and value 
added), keeping labor and capital constant, would lead to reductions in measured productivity, 
even though such productivity declines would not reflect technological changes or efficiency 
improvements. 
While the absence of measures of firm capacity utilization in our data makes it 
impossible to address this issue directly, we find this interpretation of the results unlikely 
because of the time pattern of the results. If changes in capacity utilization were the primary 
explanation for the export-driven changes in measured productivity, we would expect that the 
impact of export changes on measured productivity would be lower in the 1995-2000 period than 
in the 1995-1998 period, as firms were able to adjust their capital and labor over time.   24
As it turns out, however, the productivity impact of exports follows exactly the opposite 
pattern across the two samples. The impact of export changes on firm productivity is actually 
slightly larger in the latter period than in the former. This pattern suggests that observed 
improvements in measured productivity are due to efficiency improvements or other 
technological progress, and not just increased capacity utilization.  A capacity utilization story 
also cannot explain the greater effect of exporting on productivity when the export destination 
country is more developed.   
8.2. Potential violations of the IV exclusion restriction 
The analysis so far assumes that the exchange rate shocks only affect the various firm-
level outcomes via their effect on the firm’s exports. However, it is possible that the exchange 
rate shocks directly affect firm outcomes independently of their effect on firm exports. Here we 
address two potential alternative channels for the exchange rate shocks’ effects on firm 
productivity: via increases in foreign investment, and via intermediate input prices.  
We documented in Table 5 that instrumented changes in exports lead to increases in 
foreign investment over the 1995-2000 period, and argued that this may be due to firms’ 
increased attractiveness in the wake of export-driven performance improvements. But another 
possibility is that because existing foreign ownership tends to differentially come from the same 
countries to which firms export, the exchange rate shocks directly affect the cost of acquiring 
additional ownership shares by existing foreign owners. An exchange rate appreciation in a 
firm’s export partners would raise exports, but would also reduce the cost for investors in the 
same overseas locations to acquire additional ownership shares in the firm.
29 
If such an effect is important in practice, some fraction of the productivity improvements 
that accompany increased exports may be due to increased foreign investment rather than 
increased exports. For example, increased foreign ownership may lead to increased technology 
transfer from the overseas investors. In this case, the IV estimates of the impact of exports on 
productivity would be overstated.  
To gauge the extent to which increased foreign ownership shares in and of themselves 
might be biasing the results, we include a control for the change in foreign ownership share in 
the regressions. The results of this exercise are presented in Table 7 for the 1995-2000 period. In 
                                                 
29 When capital markets are imperfect, wealth shocks can enable greater investment, so currency appreciations in 
investor countries may lead to greater FDI outflows (Froot and Stein 1991).   25
the top row, the original IV estimates from Table 5 are presented for comparison. It turns out that 
the IV estimates for all of the outcome variables are very similar to the original estimates with 
the inclusion of this control (second row of Table 5). The coefficient on the change in foreign 
ownership variable itself (not shown) is consistently small and statistically insignificant. There is 
therefore no indication that improvements in firm performance driven by correlated changes in 
foreign ownership are imparting substantial bias to the results.
30  
A second potential violation of the exclusion restriction occurs if firms tend to import 
intermediate inputs from the same countries to which they export. For example, Chinese firms 
may import intermediate inputs from parent companies overseas, assemble these inputs into 
finished products, and then send them back to their parent companies in the same locations. For 
such firms, exchange rate appreciation in a firm’s overseas export locations also makes 
intermediate inputs more expensive. The firm’s exports should rise, while the prices of 
intermediate inputs (in Chinese yuan) should also rise. Any increase in firm productivity due to 
the increase in exports would be offset by increases in intermediate input costs (the yuan value of 
intermediate inputs should increase, which in itself decreases measured productivity). This logic 
suggests that effects of the exchange rate shocks on the yuan value of intermediate inputs should 
lead to IV estimates of exports on productivity that are biased towards zero. 
To gauge the extent to which this bias is important in practice, we regress the change in 
log intermediate inputs (valued in Chinese yuan) on the change in exports. The results are 
presented in the second-to-last column of Table 5. Assuming a constant ratio of intermediate 
inputs to output, if intermediate inputs are not imported from the export destinations, the 
proportional effect of the change in exports on sales should be similar to its effect on 
intermediate inputs—in other words, the coefficient on the change in exports should be similar in 
the sales and intermediate inputs regressions. However, if firms import intermediate inputs from 
their export destinations, then increased exports caused by exchange rate shocks are also 
associated with higher intermediate input costs, so the coefficient on the instrumented change in 
log exports should be larger in the intermediate inputs regression than in the sales regression.  It 
turns out that for both the 1995-1998 and 1995-2000 periods, the IV coefficient on the change in 
log exports in the intermediate inputs regression is actually slightly smaller in magnitude than 
                                                 
30 For changes in outcome variables over the 1995-1998 period, robustness checks analogous to those in Table 7 also 
lead to results very similar to the baseline specification (not shown due to space considerations, but available from 
the authors upon request).   26
the corresponding coefficient in the sales regression. Thus, there is no indication of substantial 
bias due to changes in intermediate inputs prices. 
  8.3. Importance of control variables 
  Inclusion in the regressions of province-industry fixed effects as well as a wide variety of 
control variables for pre-shock firm characteristics was motivated by the desire to account as 
much as possible for firm heterogeneity and any ongoing time trends in firm outcomes that may 
be correlated with firms’ initial characteristics. Here, we test the sensitivity of the empirical 
results to inclusion of these covariates.  
  In the next-to-last row of Table 7, we present IV regression results where no right-hand-
side controls are included in the regression, with the exception of the main effects of the 
variables that are interacted with the shock index. As it turns out, dropping the control variables 
leads to coefficient estimates qualitatively very similar to the original estimates. The coefficient 
estimates in the OLS and LP productivity regressions are somewhat smaller in magnitude, but 
remain statistically significant at conventional levels. This also lends credence to the assumption 
that the distribution of unexpected exchange range shocks were relatively random and not 
systematically correlated with specific firm characteristics. 
8.4. Weak instruments 
Due to concerns that the set of instruments may be relatively weak, the bottom row of 
Table 7 presents regression results where standard errors and 5% significance tests follow the 
methodology to calculate conditional IV estimates proposed by Andrews, Moreira, and Stock 
(forthcoming). Their method adjusts critical values of test statistics in the presence of weak 
instruments so that significance tests have the correct size.
31 Below each IV coefficient estimate, 
we display the Andrews, Moreira, and Stock 5% Wald critical value and the Wald statistic for 
the test of the null hypothesis that the IV estimate is equal to zero.  
Whenever the Wald statistic takes on values greater than the (regression-specific) 5% 
Wald critical value, the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% level. The inferences based on the 
AMS Wald statistics turn out to be very similar to the original results. The coefficients on the 
change in exports in the productivity regressions are statistically significantly different from zero 
at the 5% level. The same is true in the regressions for workers, capital, wages per worker, sales, 
intermediate inputs, and foreign ownership share. The only two cases where the baseline IV 
                                                 
31 The test has been implemented as the “condivreg” command in Stata by Moreira and Poi (2001).    27
results indicate rejection of the null at the 5% level but the AMS results do not are in the 
regressions for return on assets and sales per worker, where Wald statistics are slightly lower 
than AMS 5% Wald critical values. Overall, there do not seem to be strong indications of 
substantial size distortions due to weak instruments. 
  8.5. Transfer pricing  
Because our sample consists of FDI firms, one possible concern is that transfer pricing in 
response to exchange rate changes could complicate the interpretation of our results.  However, 
if transfer pricing by multinationals seeks to move profits to countries where taxation is lower, 
then optimal transfer pricing should not be affected by exchange rate changes, which do not 
affect relative taxation rates.  However, exchange rate devaluation in an export destination 
country will reduce the profits of Chinese exporters, assuming that the effect on profits of a 
lower export sales price dominates declines in the price of any imported inputs from the same 
country. If multinationals respond by moving profits to Chinese affiliates via transfer pricing in 
order to cushion the effect of the shock and take advantage of low Chinese tax rates, this would 
create a negative association between exports and profits which would lead us to underestimate 
the effect of exports on firm performance.   
8.6. Sample selection issues 
Foreign-invested 1995 exporters that also appear in the 1998 or 2000 annual surveys 
make up the sample for analysis. There are 13,605 foreign-invested firms in 1995 with positive 
exports and with complete data for all variables of interest. Our primary sample for analysis 
includes firms that could be followed through 1998 and 2000, that had complete data on all 
variables used in the analyses, and that had non-zero exports in all three years. This balanced 
1995-1998-2000 sample consisted of 3,339 firms (a 25% matching rate). 
With such a high rate of non-inclusion in the sample, it is important to consider whether 
our results are likely to be contaminated by sample selection biases. First of all, it should be kept 
in mind that the 13,606 firms in 1995 include firms of all sizes, while (due to survey design) the 
firms in the 1998 and 2000 surveys include only firms above 5 million yuan in sales revenues. In 
1995, 4,992 of the 13,606 firms (36.7%) had sales below 5 million yuan.  Even in the complete 
absence of sample selection, there would therefore be a high rate of non-inclusion because many 
firms would remain below the 5 million yuan threshold. 
It would be problematic, however, if the likelihood of remaining below the 5 million   28
sales threshold, of falling below that threshold from above, or of having zero exports in any of 
the years were related to the exchange rate shocks of interest. In addition, the shocks of interest 
could in principle also affect the likelihood that firms exit the sample via shutdown or merger 
with another firm. For example, if the firms experiencing the most negative shocks were also less 
likely to be observed in 1998 or 2000, then effects of export shocks on firm outcomes would be 
understated because the set of firms experiencing the worst shocks would be relatively 
depopulated of the firms whose outcomes deteriorated the most.  
The regressions of Appendix Table 2 test whether the exogenous shocks of interest are in 
fact correlated with non-inclusion in the sample between 1995 and the latter survey years. For 
each of the 13,606 firms observed in 1995 and that have complete data on all variables, we 
construct the predicted change in log exports from the first stage regressions of Table 4. In both 
columns of the table, the dependent variable is an indicator variable for a firm being included in 
the balanced 1995-1998-2000 sample of 3,339 firms. In column 1, the right-hand-side variable of 
interest is the predicted change in exports from 1995 to 1998 (predicted using the regression of 
Table 4, column 2), and in column 2, the predicted change in exports is from 1995 to 2000 
(calculated using coefficients from Table 4, column 4). The regressions include all province-
industry fixed effects and pre-shock control variables included in other regressions. Because the 
regressions include a generated regressor (the predicted change in log exports), bootstrapped 
standard errors are reported. 
As it turns out, the coefficients on the predicted change in log exports in both regressions 
are very small in magnitude and are not statistically significantly different from zero. There is no 
evidence that predicted exports over either 1995-1998 or 1995-2000 are correlated with inclusion 
in the sample, and therefore no indication that bias due to sample selection is a cause for 
concern.
32 
8.7 Unbalanced sample results 
All results presented thus far have been for the balanced 1995-1998-2000 firm sample, 
and so one might wonder whether the results are different when examining an expanded sample 
of firms that are not restricted to be common across 1995, 1998, and 2000. Over the 1995 to 
1998 time period, 4,605 firms can be matched, have complete data on all 1995 control variables, 
                                                 
32 Regression results are very similar if the sample is restricted to firms with at least 5 million yuan in sales in 1995. 
Furthermore, attrition from the sample that is due only to having zero exports in either 1998 or 2000 (which affects 
835 firms) is also not correlated with the predicted change in exports. Results are available from authors on request.   29
and have non-zero exports in both years. Over the 1995 to 2000 period, the corresponding 
number is 3,930 firms.  
In Appendix Tables 3 and 4, we present regression results for these unbalanced samples. 
Appendix Table 3 presents the first stage results (and is analogous to Table 4), and Appendix 
Table 4 presents the OLS and IV results (analogous to Table 5). The first-stage, OLS, and IV 
results are in most respects very similar in the balanced sample in comparison to the unbalanced 
results. The main difference of note is that the IV estimates of the impact of the change in log 
exports on productivity from 1995 to 1998 are substantially smaller in magnitude than the 
corresponding estimates for the period 1995 to 2000, and are not statistically significantly 
different from zero.  
 
9. Conclusion  
This paper has examined the impact of exogenous shocks to export demand on the 
performance of Chinese firms. In 1997, the Asian financial crisis led to large real exchange rate 
shocks in several important destinations of Chinese exports. Because most firms were not well 
diversified in their countries of export, changes in export demand showed great heterogeneity 
across firms. We find that greater real depreciation in a firm’s export partner’s currency leads to 
slower growth in firm exports from before to after the Asian crisis. Using exogenous exchange 
rate shocks and their interactions with pre-shock firm characteristics as instruments, we find that 
exporting increases firms’ total factor productivity, total sales, and return on assets. These results 
are highly robust to relaxing many of the estimation assumptions, providing support for the 
“learning by exporting” hypothesis.  Consistent with this hypothesis, we also find that the export-
productivity relationship is stronger in firms exporting to richer countries. 
These results suggest that a number of additional analyses would be worth undertaking. 
For example, it is of interest to examine productivity spillovers to firms that were not exporting 
prior to the Asian crisis: when firms’ exports fluctuate in response to exchange rate changes in 
their export destinations, does the performance of other nearby firms change? The search for 
evidence of such spillovers could take place within geographic areas (provinces) and within 
industrial sectors. It is also interesting to ask about the impact of entry into exporting, which may 
be different from the impact of increases in exporting among firms who were already exporting 
in an initial period. An approach for examining this question that builds on the present analysis   30
would be to use the average exchange rate shock in one’s province and industry as an instrument 
for export entry. This strategy could work if informational spillovers from other exporters or 
economies of scale on the part of firms that service exporters (transport providers, pure trading 
firms) lead the costs of export entry to decline when total exports from a locality rise. 
   31
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 Figure 1: Exchange Rates in Selected Destinations of Chinese Exports, Jan 1995 to Dec 2000
(Chinese yuan per unit of foreign currency, normalized to 1 in Jan 1995)
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NOTES-- Exchange rates are as of last day of each month. Data source is Bloomberg L.P.Figure 2: Chinese Exports to Top 20 Destinations, 1990-2004 (Source: UN COMTRADE)
(Destinations in increasing order of post-1997 real exchange rate depreciation, from left to right, top to bottom.)















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































YearFigure 3: Exchange rate shock and change in exports 


























NOTES -- Pre-crisis control variables are: 1995 log sales income; 1994 log sales income; 1995 share of exports to top two destinations; indicator for firm existing in 1994; indicator for firm exporting in 1994; foreign share of ownership; log of industry weighted 
average exports to 1995 destinations (weighted by firm's 1995 export destinations), separately for 1993 and 1996; indicator variables for firm size categories; 1995 exports as share of firm sales; 1994 exports as share of firm sales; indicator for firm exporting 










































Change in Ln(exports) Upper 95% confidence band Lower 95% confidence bandTable 1: Exports, exchange rate shocks, and change in exports (China, 1995-1998)
(Top 20 Chinese export destinations in 1995)






% of total 
exports in 
1995
United Kingdom -0.14 0.23 6.9 3.6%
USA -0.07 0.36 54.4 28.0%
Panama -0.03 0.19 1.7 0.9%
Russian Federation -0.02 0.04 1.8 0.9%
Italy -0.01 0.29 3.6 1.8%
Brazil -0.01 0.42 1.8 0.9%
Canada 0.04 0.24 3.6 1.8%
Spain 0.11 0.32 2.2 1.1%
France 0.13 0.30 4.1 2.1%
Australia 0.13 0.18 3.6 1.9%
Singapore 0.14 -0.30 6.6 3.4%
Netherlands 0.15 0.25 5.3 2.7%
Belgium-Luxembourg 0.16 0.26 2.0 1.0%
Germany 0.16 0.13 11.5 5.9%
Philippines 0.23 -0.18 2.5 1.3%
Japan 0.31 0.06 37.1 19.1%
Thailand 0.32 -0.40 2.7 1.4%
Malaysia 0.34 -0.32 2.3 1.2%
Rep. of Korea 0.43 -0.30 8.5 4.4%
Indonesia 0.90 -0.90 2.0 1.0%
NOTES -- Data source is UN Comtrade dataset. "Shock index" is change in log real 
exchange rate from 1995-1998 expressed as fraction of 1995 value (i.e. 10% depreciation is 
0.1, 10% appreciation is -0.1). Change in ln(exports) is from 1995-1998. Exports to Hong 
Kong are dropped from dataset, and Hong Kong's reported re-exports are considered 
exports of China to respective destinations. Destinations in table account for 84% of total 
Chinese exports in 1995.Table 2: Impact of Real Exchange Rate Shocks on Chinese Exports (1995-1998)
(Ordinary least-squares regressions)














Shock index -0.632 -1.042 -0.161 -0.881
(0.057)*** (0.293)*** (0.088)* (0.262)***
R-squared 0.45 0.04 0.00 0.02
Num. obs. 153 87,934 87,934 87,934
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
NOTES -- Standard errors (in parentheses). Data source is UN Comtrade dataset. Unit of observation 
in first regression is an export destination country. Unit of observation in other regressions is a 
destination-product combination, where product is HS (1992) 6-digit category. Observations weighted 
by first-period (1995) total exports. Changes are from 1995-1998. "Shock index" is export destination's 
change in real exchange rate from 1995-1998 expressed as fraction of 1995 value (i.e. 10% 
depreciation is 1.1, 10% appreciation is 0.9). "Total value" is total value of exports. "Unit value" is total 
value divided by quantity.  Exports to Hong Kong are dropped from dataset, and Hong Kong's reported 
re-exports are considered exports of China to respective destinations.Table 3: Summary statistics for Chinese firms
Mean Std. Dev. Num. Obs.
Shock index 0.13 0.15 3,339
1995-1998 1995-2000
Dependent variables Mean Std. Dev. Num. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Num. Obs.
Δ Ln(exports) 0.45 1.26 3,339 0.49 1.44 3,339
Δ Ln(productivity, OLS) 0.57 2.92 3,339 0.83 2.77 3,339
Δ Ln(productivity, LP) 0.67 2.95 3,339 0.95 2.81 3,339
Δ Ln(workers) 0.17 0.58 3,339 0.19 0.69 3,339
Δ Ln(capital) 0.16 0.68 3,339 0.13 0.85 3,339
Δ Ln(capital/worker) -0.02 0.77 3,339 -0.07 0.88 3,339
Δ Ln(wages/worker) 0.25 0.72 3,312 0.37 0.68 3,312
Δ return on assets -0.01 0.15 3,339 0.01 0.18 3,339
Δ Ln(sales) 0.35 0.91 3,338 0.45 1.06 3,338
Δ Ln(sales/worker) 0.18 0.81 3,338 0.26 0.87 3,338
Δ Ln(intermediate inputs) 0.29 0.94 3,339 0.37 1.07 3,339
Δ foreign ownership share 0.01 0.18 3,323 0.01 0.20 3,323
Pre-crisis (1995) characteristics
Mean Std. Dev. Num. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Num. Obs.
Sales (US$) 9,538,428 36,988,462 3,339 9,538,428 36,988,462 3,339
Exports (US$) 5,684,255 19,162,600 3,339 5,684,255 19,162,600 3,339
Export share of sales 0.75 0.34 3,339 0.75 0.34 3,339
Export share of top 2 destinations 0.95 0.16 3,339 0.95 0.16 3,339
Per cap. GDP in export dest. (US$) 25,763 11,159 3,339 25,774 11,151 3,339
Foreign ownership share 0.69 0.30 3,339 0.69 0.30 3,339
Capital/worker (US$) 10,156 20,560 3,339 10,156 20,560 3,339
NOTES -- Data are from Chinese Industrial Census 1995 and Annual Firm Survey 1998. Sample is balanced across 
1995, 1998, and 2000. "Shock index" is real exchange rate index based on firm's pre-crisis export composition, 
normalized to 1 in 1995 (i.e. 10% depreciation is 0.1, 10% appreciation is -0.1). Productivity measures are OLS (from 
regression of log value added on log fixed assets and log employment) and Levinsohn-Petrin (LP). Table 4: Impact of exchange rate shocks on exports of Chinese firms
(OLS estimates)
Dependent variable:    Δ Ln(exports)
Time period for Δ Ln(exports): 1995-1998 1995-1998 1995-2000 1995-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Shock index -0.053 -0.006 -0.035 0
(0.024)** (0.059) (0.033) (0.091)
Shock index * -0.019 -0.007
  Ln(per capita GDP in destinations), 1995 (0.012) (0.018)
Shock index * 0.059 0.045
   % of exports to Hong Kong, 1995 (0.065) (0.101)
Shock index * 0.028 0.058
   Foreign ownership share, 1995 (0.013)** (0.016)***
Shock index * 0.029 0.01
   Ln(capital/worker), 1995 (0.018) (0.018)
Shock index * -0.029 -0.024
   Ln(sales), 1995 (0.034) (0.031)
Shock index * 0.01 -0.02
   Ln(productivity, LP), 1995 (0.013) (0.025)
Province-industry fixed effects YYYY
Pre-crisis control variables YYYY
Observations 3339 3339 3339 3339
R-squared 0.44 0.44 0.41 0.42
F-test: Joint signif. of instrument(s) 4.73 10.09 1.12 6.88
  P-value 0.03 0.00 0.29 0.00
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
NOTES -- Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by first export destination. Unit of observation is a firm. Changes are from
1995-1998 or 1995-2000. Sample is balanced across 1995, 1998, and 2000. Firms included in sample all had nonzero exports
in 1995. See Table 3 for variable definitions and other notes. Shock index and variables interacted with shock index all are 
normalized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Province-industry fixed effects are interactions between indicator 
variables for 26 provinces and for 24 industries. 
Pre-crisis control variables are: 1995 log sales income; 1994 log sales income; 1995 share of exports to top two destinations; 
indicator for firm existing in 1994; indicator for firm exporting in 1994; foreign share of ownership; log of industry weighted 
average exports to 1995 destinations (weighted by firm's 1995 export destinations), separately for 1993 and 1996; indicator 
variables for firm size categories; 1995 exports as share of firm sales; 1994 exports as share of firm sales; indicator for firm 
exporting entire output in 1995; log exports in 1995; log exports in 1994; 1995 log capital-labor ratio; 1995 log producitivity 
(Levinsohn-Petrin estimate); 1995 fraction of firm exports destined for Hong Kong; and log 1995 weighted average per capita 
GDP in firm's export destinations (weighted by firm's 1995 exports).Table 5: Impact of change in exports on change in firm outcomes
(Coefficients on Δ Ln(exports) in OLS and IV regressions)
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Ordinary least-squares 0.258 0.355 0.16 0.14 -0.02 0.06 0.022 0.458 0.298 0.451 0.008
(0.034)*** (0.040)*** (0.023)*** (0.017)*** (0.009)** (0.012)*** (0.002)*** (0.035)*** (0.018)*** (0.030)*** (0.003)**
[3339] [3339] [3339] [3339] [3339] [3312] [3339] [3338] [3338] [3339] [3323]
Instrumental variables 1.191 1.127 -0.107 -0.076 0.03 0.456 0.096 0.65 0.752 0.624 0.031
(0.438)*** (0.419)*** (0.117) (0.112) (0.091) (0.125)*** (0.032)*** (0.139)*** (0.114)*** (0.126)*** (0.041)
[3339] [3339] [3339] [3339] [3339] [3312] [3339] [3338] [3338] [3339] [3323]
1995-2000
Ordinary least-squares 0.257 0.382 0.206 0.196 -0.011 0.061 0.028 0.499 0.293 0.489 0.005
(0.016)*** (0.013)*** (0.011)*** (0.013)*** (0.013) (0.012)*** (0.002)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.025)*** (0.004)
[3339] [3339] [3339] [3339] [3339] [3312] [3339] [3338] [3338] [3339] [3323]
Instrumental variables 1.273 1.485 0.345 0.392 0.047 0.294 0.068 0.697 0.349 0.653 0.117
(0.336)*** (0.321)*** (0.179)* (0.189)** (0.103) (0.135)** (0.033)** (0.215)*** (0.200)* (0.206)*** (0.054)**
[3339] [3339] [3339] [3339] [3339] [3312] [3339] [3338] [3338] [3339] [3323]
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
NOTES-- Each coefficient (standard error) is from a separate regression of the change in firm outcome on Δ Ln(exports). Standard errors clustered by first export 
destination. Sample size in brackets. Samples are balanced across 1995, 1998, and 2000 surveys. In IV regressions, first stage regressions are in even-numbered 
columns of Table 5. All regressions include fixed effects for province-industry and all pre-crisis control variables listed in Table 4. See Tables 3 and 4 for variable 
definitions and other notes. Table 6: Heterogeneity in Impact of exchange rate shocks on exports of Chinese firms, 1995-2000
(IV estimates)








Δ ln(exports) 0.609 0.806 0.507 0.613
(0.303)** (0.300)*** (0.362) (0.370)*
Δ ln(exports) * 0.172 0.18 0.363 0.376
   Ln(per capita GDP in destinations), 1995 (0.097)* (0.096)* (0.143)** (0.146)***
Δ ln(exports) * -0.105 -0.124
   % of exports to Hong Kong, 1995 (0.119) (0.122)
Δ ln(exports) * 0.094 0.243
   Foreign ownership share, 1995 (0.318) (0.325)
Δ ln(exports) * -0.467 -0.504
   Ln(capital/worker), 1995 (0.214)** (0.219)**
Δ ln(exports) * 0.378 0.45
   Ln(sales), 1995 (0.186)** (0.191)**
Δ ln(exports) * -0.425 -0.459
   Ln(productivity, LP), 1995 (0.260) (0.266)*
Province-industry fixed effects YYYY
Pre-crisis control variables YYYY
Observations 3339 3339 3339 3339
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
NOTES -- Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by first export destination. Unit of observation is a firm. Changes are 
from 1995-2000. Variables interacted with change in log exports all are normalized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 
1. Instrumental variables for interaction terms with Δln(exports) are original instruments (listed in Table 4) interacted the 
corresponding interaction term. See Tables 3 and 4 for variable definitions and other notes. Table 7: Other robustness checks for impact of change in exports on change in firm outcomes, 1995-2000
(Coefficients on Δ Ln(exports) in IV regressions)









Ln (capital) Ln (capital / 
worker)











Baseline IV estimates 1.273 1.485 0.345 0.392 0.047 0.294 0.068 0.697 0.349 0.653 0.117
(0.336)*** (0.321)*** (0.179)* (0.189)** (0.103) (0.135)** (0.033)** (0.215)*** (0.200)* (0.206)*** (0.054)**
[3339] [3339] [3339] [3339] [3339] [3312] [3339] [3338] [3338] [3339] [3323]
Controlling for change 1.256 1.466 0.345 0.374 0.028 0.262 0.069 0.675 0.326 0.635 n.a.
in foreign share (0.362)*** (0.346)*** (0.190)* (0.182)** (0.105) (0.121)** (0.033)** (0.223)*** (0.214) (0.221)***
[3323] [3323] [3323] [3323] [3323] [3296] [3323] [3322] [3322] [3323]
No control variables 0.93 1.18 0.415 0.354 -0.056 0.296 0.095 0.932 0.515 0.839 0.11
(0.392)** (0.318)*** (0.175)** (0.176)** (0.077) (0.157)* (0.027)*** (0.168)*** (0.201)** (0.146)*** (0.045)**
[3339] [3339] [3339] [3339] [3339] [3312] [3339] [3338] [3338] [3339] [3323]
Andrews, Moreira, Stock 1.273 1.485 0.345 0.392 0.047 0.294 0.068 0.697 0.349 0.653 0.117
significance tests (0.468) (0.476) (0.146) (0.195) (0.191) (0.171) (0.038) (0.156) (0.162) (0.179) (0.054)
[3339] [3339] [3339] [3339] [3339] [3312] [3339] [3338] [3338] [3339] [3323]
5% Wald critical value 4.29 4.49 5.58 4.37 3.38 3.12 3.76 18.58 7.12 13.3 2.78
Wald statistic 8.22 10.82 6.26 4.48 0.07 3.31 3.57 22.36 5.16 14.8 5.14
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
NOTES-- Each coefficient (standard error) is from a separate regression of the change in firm outcome on Δ Ln(exports). Sample size in brackets. In bottom row of results, IV 
estimates, 5% Wald critical values, and Wald statistics based on Andrews, Moreira, and Stock (2005). All regressions include fixed effects for province-industry and all pre-crisis 
control variables listed in Table 4. See Tables 3 and 4 for variable definitions and other notes. Appendix Table 1: Predicting firm's exchange rate shock with pre-crisis variables
(Chinese exporting firms, 1995)
(OLS estimates)
Dependent variable: Shock index, 1995-1998
(1) (2)
Ln(sales), 1995 -0.004 -0.001
(0.0050) (0.0040)
Δ Ln(sales), 1994-1995 0.003 0.006
(0.0040) (0.003)*
Firm has 1994 sales (indicator), 1995 -0.006 0.014
(0.0270) (0.0240)
Ln(exports), 1995 0.003 0.001
(0.0050) (0.0040)
Δ Ln(exports), 1994-1995 0 -0.003
(0.0030) (0.0030)
Firm has 1994 exports (indicator), 1995 -0.031 -0.016
(0.015)** (0.0140)
Ln(total exports in firm's industry to same destinations), 1995 -0.006 -0.018
(0.002)*** (0.002)***
Δ Ln(total exports in firm's industry to same destinations), 1993-1995 0.14 0.211
(0.008)*** (0.009)***
Export share of sales, 1995 0.02 0.002
(0.0180) (0.0160)
Δ Export share of sales, 1994-1995 -0.02 -0.003
(0.0170) (0.0150)
Firm exports 100% of sales (indicator), 1995 -0.023 -0.004
(0.007)*** (0.0060)
Exports to top 2 destinations as share of total exports, 1995 0.052 0.054
(0.015)*** (0.014)***
Ln(per cap. GDP in export destinations), 1995 0.031 0.046
(0.004)*** (0.004)***
Foreign ownership share, 1995 -0.023 0.014
(0.009)*** (0.0080)
Δ Ln(capital/worker), 1995 0.008 0.008
(0.002)*** (0.002)***
Province-industry fixed effects - Y
Observations 3,339 3,339
R-squared 0.13 0.46
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
NOTES-- Unit of observation is a firm. All changes are from 1995-1998. Firms included in sample all 
had nonzero exports in 1995. Province-industry fixed effects are interactions between indicator 
variables for 26 provinces and for 24 industries. Appendix Table 2: Impact of predicted change in exports on sample selection
(Ordinary least-squares regressions)
Dependent variable: Included in balanced 
1995-1998-2000 
sample (indicator)
Included in balanced 
1995-1998-2000 
sample (indicator)
Time period for predicted change in exports: 1995-1998 1995-2000
Predicted change in exports -0.02 -0.024
(0.491) (0.253)
Province-industry fixed effects YY
Pre-crisis control variables YY
Observations 13,605 13,605
R-squared 0.21 0.21
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Addendum:
Number of firms included in final sample 3,339 3,339
Rate of inclusion in sample 25% 25%
Predicted change in exports is from: Table 4, column 2 Table 4, column 4
NOTES -- Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Unit of observation is a firm. Sample is all firms with complete data on right-
hand-side variables in 1995 Chinese industrial census.
Pre-crisis control variables are: 1995 log sales income; 1994 log sales income; 1995 share of exports to top two destinations; indicator 
for firm existing in 1994; indicator for firm exporting in 1994; foreign share of ownership; log of industry weighted average exports to 1995 
destinations (weighted by firm's 1995 export destinations), separately for 1993 and 1996; indicator variables for firm size categories; 1995 
exports as share of firm sales; 1994 exports as share of firm sales; indicator for firm exporting entire output in 1995; log exports in 1995; 
log exports in 1994; 1995 log capital-labor ratio; 1995 fraction homogeneous products in firm's industry; and log 1995 weighted average 
per capita GDP in firm's export destinations (weighted by firm's 1995 exports).Appendix Table 3: Impact of exchange rate shocks on exports of Chinese firms (unbalanced sample)
(OLS estimates)
Dependent variable:    Δ Ln(exports)
Time period for Δ Ln(exports): 1995-1998 1995-1998 1995-2000 1995-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Shock index -0.049 0.01 -0.042 0.016
(0.027)* (0.090) (0.031) (0.060)
Shock index * -0.025 -0.007
  Ln(per capita income in destinations), 1995 (0.011)** (0.017)
Shock index * 0.079 0.084
   % of exports to Hong Kong, 1995 (0.084) (0.072)
Shock index * 0.023 0.065
   Foreign ownership share, 1995 (0.012)* (0.018)***
Shock index * 0.048 0.014
   Ln(capital/worker), 1995 (0.015)*** (0.026)
Shock index * -0.014 -0.011
   Ln(sales), 1995 (0.029) (0.019)
Shock index * -0.005 -0.014
   Ln(productivity, LP), 1995 (0.016) (0.020)
Province-industry fixed effects YYYY
Pre-crisis control variables YYYY
Observations 4605 4605 3930 3930
R-squared 0.38 0.38 0.4 0.41
F-test: Joint signif. of instrument(s) 3.22 10.12 1.77 8.58
  P-value 0.08 0.00 0.19 0.00
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
NOTES -- Standard errors in parentheses. Unit of observation is a firm. Changes are from 1995-1998 or 1995-2000. Firms 
included in sample all had nonzero exports in 1995. See Table 3 for variable definitions and other notes. Shock index and 
variables interacted with shock index all are normalized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Province-industry fixed effects 
are interactions between indicator variables for 26 provinces and for 24 industries. 
Pre-crisis control variables are: 1995 log sales income; 1994 log sales income; 1995 share of exports to top two destinations; 
indicator for firm existing in 1994; indicator for firm exporting in 1994; foreign share of ownership; log of industry weighted 
average exports to 1995 destinations (weighted by firm's 1995 export destinations), separately for 1993 and 1996; indicator 
variables for firm size categories; 1995 exports as share of firm sales; 1994 exports as share of firm sales; indicator for firm 
exporting entire output in 1995; log exports in 1995; log exports in 1994; 1995 log capital-labor ratio; 1995 log producitivity 
(Levinsohn-Petrin estimate); 1995 fraction of firm exports destined for Hong Kong; and log 1995 weighted average per capita 
GDP in firm's export destinations (weighted by firm's 1995 exports).Appendix Table 4: Impact of change in exports on change in firm outcomes (unbalanced sample across 1998, 2000)
(Ordinary least-squares and instrumental variables estimates)









Ln (capital) Ln (capital / 
worker)













Ordinary least-squares 0.279 0.374 0.158 0.126 -0.032 0.041 0.023 0.427 0.269 0.415 0.005
(0.028)*** (0.027)*** (0.021)*** (0.017)*** (0.006)*** (0.011)*** (0.003)*** (0.034)*** (0.016)*** (0.031)*** (0.003)*
[4605] [4605] [4605] [4605] [4605] [4565] [4605] [4604] [4604] [4605] [4596]
Instrumental variables 0.562 0.556 -0.004 -0.118 -0.114 0.258 0.079 0.553 0.555 0.491 0.005
(0.341) (0.343) (0.111) (0.112) (0.106) (0.133)* (0.025)*** (0.105)*** (0.125)*** (0.108)*** (0.022)
[4605] [4605] [4605] [4605] [4605] [4565] [4605] [4604] [4604] [4605] [4596]
1995-2000
Ordinary least-squares 0.242 0.358 0.19 0.19 0 0.068 0.028 0.485 0.295 0.479 0.003
(0.016)*** (0.015)*** (0.008)*** (0.007)*** (0.010) (0.013)*** (0.005)*** (0.016)*** (0.013)*** (0.020)*** (0.002)
[3930] [3930] [3930] [3930] [3930] [3897] [3930] [3929] [3929] [3930] [3918]
Instrumental variables 1.164 1.363 0.321 0.413 0.092 0.166 0.088 0.649 0.324 0.599 0.107
(0.451)** (0.418)*** (0.195) (0.171)** (0.101) (0.108) (0.039)** (0.207)*** (0.202) (0.209)*** (0.052)**
[3930] [3930] [3930] [3930] [3930] [3897] [3930] [3929] [3929] [3930] [3918]
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
NOTES-- Each coefficient (standard error) is from a separate regression of the change in firm outcome on Δ Ln(exports). Sample size in brackets. Sample unbalanced 
across 1995-1998 and 1995-2000. All regressions include fixed effects for province-industry and all pre-crisis control variables listed in Table 4. See Tables 3 and 4 for 
variable definitions and other notes. 